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Privacy of Financial Information and
Civil Rights Issues: The Implications
for Investigating and Prosecuting
International Economic Crime*
Richard T. Preiss*
I. Introduction: The Two Key Tensions
Bank secrecy laws and the individual civil right of financial
privacy generally, originated decades ago in a simpler time, when
the electronic wire transfer did not exist and sophisticated economic
criminals did not regularly take advantage of the international bank
payments system. Today, however, when most countries are linked
together in what is known as the global economy, bank secrecy
laws and the related sovereignty, political, and economic concerns
of individual nations all too often impede and frustrate legitimate
criminal investigations and prosecutions of money laundering1 and
other international economic crime. The problem that bank
secrecy poses for law enforcement was identified twenty-five years
ago by Robert M. Morgenthau, currently the District Attorney of
* © 1996 Richard T. Preiss.
* Mr. Preiss is an Assistant District Attorney in the Office of Robert M.
Morgenthau, District Attorney of the County of New York and has been so
employed since 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, he prosecuted felony cases
including homicide cases. In 1990, he was assigned to work on the investigation
of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International with a team of prosecutors and
investigators in Manhattan. The views expressed in this paper are those of Mr.
Preiss and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the District
Attorney of the County of New York. The writer gratefully acknowledges the
many helpful comments and suggestions of Raj K. Bhala, Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary and Rowan
Bosworth-Davies, Titmuss Sainer & Dechert (London).
1. Money laundering is defined in different jurisdictions in different ways.
Conceptually, money laundering is nothing more than the disguising, or concealing,
of the illegal origin of the proceeds of crime. The motivations behind money
laundering are as multifaceted as the individual laws of sovereign governments.
The proceeds come from all kinds of illegal activity. Proceeds of fraud, theft,
narcotics trafficking and the concealment of income and other assets from taxing
authorities, are a few examples.
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the County of New York and former United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York. He was testifying before the
United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency when
he said that,
[A]buse of secret foreign accounts is no longer limited to
members of organized criminal syndicates and hoodlums.
Although the use by the organized underworld of these
accounts is substantial, to an ever increasing extent they are
now being used by wealthy and otherwise respectable persons
in the business and financial world to cheat on taxes, to trade
in securities in violation of our securities laws... to perpetuate
corporate and other frauds, and to hide the fruits of other white
collar crimes ...
This article is not so much an effort to solve the bank secrecy
problem, but rather a focus on the civil rights issues that arise when
investigating and prosecuting economic crime, and specifically when
the documentary evidence is in a foreign country. This article
addresses the tension existing between the legitimate needs of law
enforcement, on the one hand, and the desire for confidentiality of
an individual's financial affairs on the other. Additionally, this
article addresses the tension existing between law enforcement of
one country versus the political, economic, and sovereignty
concerns of other foreign governments. Ultimately, this article
concludes that confidentiality and financial privacy rules in the area
of bank secrecy are founded less upon a concern for a right of
privacy and more upon economic, political, and sovereignty
concerns. Today, the global community of nations, by their lack of
concerted action, has chosen to value the free flow of capital above
an interest in effectively combatting the spread of international
economic crime. This article proposes using an asset-based, model
multilateral agreement by which governments may agree to assist
each other with cross-border criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions in an effective and expeditious fashion, while preserving
privacy where privacy should be preserved.
2. Hearing On Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 10, 1970)
(Testimony of Robert M. Morgenthau).
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II. The Origins of the Bank Secrecy Laws and Their Develop-
ment
When speaking of a civil right of privacy in the context of
bank secrecy laws, one does not describe an internationally
respected human right. There is no internationally recognized
financial privacy right. Instead, one must discuss a value judgment
which has meaning only after examining the laws and traditions of
an individual nation' and the result when that value judgment of
financial privacy runs up against another important domestic
interest in that country. Whether, when, and how the financial
privacy right gives way to another domestic interest within a
country permits an evaluation of the degree of respect ascribed to
the financial right of privacy.
Modern bank secrecy laws trace their origin to the events
occurring after World War .4 The economies of many countries
suffered from hyper-inflation and imposed exchange restrictions
which limited the freedom of their citizens to move capital out of
those countries.5 Some of these governments were totalitarian.6
Persons of means wanted to hold their assets in safe places outside
of their home countries. As a result, countries like Switzerland
made bank secrecy the law of the land.' Many other countries
followed the Swiss example!
With the end of World War II and the rise of socialist govern-
ments, the Iron Curtain, currency restrictions, and heavy income
taxes, more and more capital flowed toward countries with bank
secrecy laws.9 There was also a rise in the criminalization of
income tax evasion in the United States and elsewhere, providing
additional motivation for citizens to hide their assets from their
home governments by placing them in countries where favorable
local laws provided protection.1° Small soft currency11 countries
3. For a discussion of the history and evolution of bank secrecy and blocking
laws, and an examination of foreign laws and financial mechanisms used to protect
the right to financial privacy, see C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The
United States' Assault On Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454,
455-64 (1992).
4. Id. at 455.
5. Id. (citations omitted).
6. For instance, the Nazis required all German nationals to report all assets
held outside of Germany upon pain of death. Id. at 455 (citations omitted).
7. Id.
8. Jones, supra note 3, at 456-457.
9. Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
10. Id.
19961
528 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3
lacking hard currency12 sought the deposits of persons of means
by enacting bank secrecy laws in Latin America, the Caribbean,
and elsewhere.
1 3
Because such laws provide the opportunity to engage in
criminal activity, law enforcement, including United States law
enforcement, has viewed bank secrecy and blocking laws with
suspicion, and often outright hostility.14  U.S. prosecutors have
made many attacks upon foreign bank secrecy laws in their
attempts to enforce U.S. criminal law.15 Their efforts have often
met with success.
16
This aggressive approach by U.S. prosecutors can subject the
United States to charges of arrogance and disrespect for the
sovereign rights of other governments. The contrary view is that
bank secrecy laws are a free market response to limitations upon
the free movement of capital, which merely facilitate the free
movement of capital from one place to another. The argument is
that the United States and other home countries have no right to
expect other host countries to impose home country fiscal require-
ments and financial laws upon host country financial institutions.
Sovereign nations have the right to provide a civil right of financial
privacy if they choose. The argument continues that economies
that are over-regulated, over-taxed, and/or impose currency
exchange restrictions upon their citizens should not be surprised
when other countries choose to provide an opportunity to move
assets elsewhere.
In some countries, the recognized right of financial privacy
prevents governmental intrusion into the private financial matters
11. As used in this article, the term soft currency means a currency which is
not widely accepted and freely convertible into other currencies.
12. As used in this article, the term hard currency means a currency which is
widely accepted and freely convertible into other currencies. The currencies of
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Switzerland and the United
States are examples of hard currencies.
13. Jones, supra note 3, at 456 n.8.
14. Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at n.10.
16. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d. 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). In that decision, a Canadian chartered bank, with
offices in forty-five countries including the United States and the Bahamas, was
the subject of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum served at an office in Miami,
Florida and which called for the production of bank records. Id. at 1386. The
Bank asserted that production of the documents would violate Bahamian bank
secrecy law and subject it to criminal prosecution in the Bahamas. Id. at 1387.
The court held that the subpoena was enforceable against the Bank, considerations
of comity notwithstanding. Id. at 1391.
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of individuals and companies." In others, it prevents such
intrusion by private individuals."i In still other countries, the
financial privacy right prevents intrusion by the government and
private individuals. 9 Rarely will a right of financial privacy be
absolute. The variations are best illustrated by example.
In the United States, there are statutes which prohibit certain
government agencies from gaining access to an individual's financial
records absent specific authorization or certain judicial orders.2'
There are other statutes prohibiting the Internal Revenue Service
and its employees from disclosing the financial information
contained in a citizen's tax return,21 even to another government
agency, unless, for example, there is reason to believe that a citizen
has evaded taxes.22 The violation of this prohibition is a felony
punishable by up to five years in prison.2 In still other instances,
consumer credit reporting agencies are prohibited from disclosing
financial account information to other private individuals, or the
government, absent legal authorization or a court order.24 As is
often the case, in each of the examples set forth, there are
exceptions provided when important government interests are at
stake.
In Germany, the right of financial privacy is founded less upon
any specific regulation' than upon tradition and an implied
contractual relation between the banking customer and his bank-
er.6 The breach of this contractual relationship can result in an
assessment of civil damages against the banker.27 The right is
limited and gives way in criminal cases and other situations where
the law deems it important.'
17. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1978).
18. See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY (Dennis Campbell ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell 1992).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1978).
21. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1993).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h) (1993).
23. 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a) (1990). The statute also provides that an Internal
Revenue Service officer or employee convicted of this offense must be discharged
from the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1995).
25. For a general discussion of German law as it relates to banking secrecy,
and examples of when it must give way to other important laws and rules, see
HARALD JUNG, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 213-30 (Dennis Campbell ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell 1992).
26. Id. at 214.
27. Id. at 230.
28. Id. at 213-30.
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In classic bank secrecy countries, a high value is placed upon
the privacy of an individual's financial affairs. This right of
financial privacy is strictly enforced against all, foreign or domestic,
including the domestic taxing authorities.
A person's financial affairs ought, in general, to be a private
matter between that person and his banker. However, this proposi-
tion does not, and should not, amount to an absolute, unconditional
right. To be sure, an individual's bank balances, his other assets
and his liabilities are not the business of his friends, neighbors, col-
leagues or in some instances, even family members, unless he
chooses to make them their business. He should, and normally
does, have the right to keep his non-public financial affairs private
from those persons with no legitimate reason to know this informa-
tion. Here we speak only of privacy against intrusion by private
individuals. However, what happens when important law enforce-
ment interests of the home country29 come into play, and the
sovereign, economic, and political concerns of host countries"
enter the fray?
III. Law Enforcement Interests: A Hypothetical Case
An example of the manner in which these tensions arise is the
hypothetical case of the trader who is a British citizen, working for
a British bank in Singapore, and falsifies trading records in order
to conceal losses or garner extra profits.31 The home country law
enforcement authorities possess enough information and evidence
to give them cause for investigating the trader, but when they make
a request of that foreign host country, they confront a maze of
bank secrecy laws, privacy laws, and other concerns which often
have the same effect as bank secrecy laws.
The hypothetical example demonstrates the impact of bank
secrecy and other confidentiality laws on the effective detection,
investigation, and prosecution of economic crime and related
abuses. It also illustrates the civil rights and other issues that arise
in international criminal cases. What financial privacy rights exist
where a government reasonably suspects that a crime has been
committed in the home country? What privacy rights should attach
to bank account records, or other financial records, in the host
29. The country conducting the criminal investigation or prosecution.
30. Countries where the financial account records are kept.
31. E.g., engages in improper trades in one country and deposits the stolen
proceeds in a foreign bank account.
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foreign country if the home country prosecutor requests access to
records located in the host country? Finally, what sovereignty,
political, and economic issues are intertwined with the foreign bank
secrecy jurisdiction's laws against disclosure?
A return to our hypothetical trader example32 is illustrative
of the two tensions and the implications of how the tensions are
resolved. Suppose that the trader falsifies the records of his trades
in Singapore, wire transfers some of the stolen money to the
United States, and invests it in an account at a brokerage firm in
New York. By use of dollar drafts33 drawn on a Singapore bank,
he sends the rest of the money from Singapore to an account in
Bank Number One in Bank Secrecy Jurisdiction (BSJ).34 His
banker at Bank Number One in BSJ uses some of these funds to
purchase a villa in the Bavarian Alps in preparation for the trader's
imminent arrival from Singapore. Pursuant to the dishonest
trader's instructions, the U.S. brokerage firm wire transfers some
of the funds to another dollar bank account at Bank Number Two
in BSJ and invests the rest of the money in publicly traded shares
of stock in the United States. As often happens in these kinds of
cases, the fraud comes to light and the Singapore authorities begin
their criminal investigation, although by now the trader has fled
Singapore and is safely living in his German villa. We will assume
that our trader has never set foot in the United States or in BSJ.
Singapore has a legitimate interest in investigating to deter-
mine if a crime has taken place in Singapore and determining
whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the trader. Under
the international principle of territoriality,35 Singapore has jurisdic-
tion over everything that happens within its territory. Singapore
32. The hypothetical example has been simplified for illustration purposes. In
a typical case involving money laundering of large amounts of funds, there would
be many more banks and host countries or way-stations through which funds
would be laundered.
33. Like a check, a dollar draft is an order for the payment of dollars drawn
upon a bank.
34. BSJ is a hypothetical bank secrecy country. There are many bank secrecy
jurisdictions which could have been chosen to illustrate the various laws and
practices of such countries and their effects upon international criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions. Rather than single out any one bank secrecy jurisdiction's
laws and practices, the writer has chosen to create a hypothetical bank secrecy
country which has some typical bank secrecy laws and rules. In constructing the
laws and rules for the hypothetical country BSJ, the writer acknowledges reliance
upon INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY (Dennis Campbell ed., 1992) and its survey
of the laws of various bank secrecy countries.
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 17-18
(1965).
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might also be concerned that, should the international financial
community perceive a lack of transparency and effective regulation
of its financial markets, international business could choose to
move elsewhere or not come to Singapore in the first instance.
Presumably, the authorities in Singapore will locate the relevant
bank accounts of the trader in Singapore, but now they must trace
the movement of the stolen funds, either to prove their case,
recover the money, or for other reasons under Singapore law.
They cannot wait too long to locate the fraudulently obtained
assets, because the longer they wait, the greater the opportunity for
the trader to move the assets around the world. Once the
dishonest trader learns that Singapore is on his trail, he will have
every motivation to move the assets to other hospitable jurisdic-
tions.
The Singapore authorities might choose to ask the United
States for help in their search for the proceeds of the crime.
Singapore law may require that the law enforcement authorities go
through their foreign office to contact the United States govern-
ment. They will discover that it is not easy to acquire the records
from the brokerage firm, that this will all take time, and time is not
the friend of the criminal investigator in a case such as this.
Various international protocols will have to be followed. The
brokerage firm will not turn over their records without a valid
subpoena. The State Department in the U.S. will direct the
Singapore request to the United States Department of Justice
Office of International Affairs36 and eventually a federal grand
jury subpoena might be issued and the brokerage records obtained.
However, because the records were obtained by use of a grand jury
subpoena, the federal prosecutor may not turn over those records
to Singapore without the written permission of a federal judge, who
may or may not be inclined to grant the request.
37
What has happened so far has less to do with a concern for the
privacy of the trader's records, than for observing principles of
American sovereignty and complying with American laws restrict-
ing access to private financial records38 and grand jury evidence.
3 1
36. The United States Department of Justice is the central authority for the
handling of requests for assistance made of the United States by foreign govern-
ments. The Office of International Affairs (OIA) is a division within the
Department of Justice. 0IA processes all of these incoming requests and the
formal requests for assistance made by federal and state law enforcement agencies
in the United States to foreign governments.
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 190.25(4)(a).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1978).
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Here lies the tension between the need for the records by one
country and the sovereignty concerns of another country where
evidence is located.
The United States authorities might well take the view that the
British4° trader's crimes in Singapore, and the use of U.S. financial
institutions to launder part of the proceeds, is a crime serious
enough to merit a United States investigation and prosecution,
independent and apart from the Singapore investigation. The
territoriality principle 41 of international law grants jurisdiction to
the United States because our trader wired money into the United
States.
In the United States generally, and in the jurisdiction of the
State of New York, it is relatively easy for the prosecutor to
acquire domestic financial information in a criminal case because
the law tips the scales in favor of disclosure.42 The tension
between the ordinary right of individual privacy versus the
legitimate needs of law enforcement is eased, but not eliminated.43
However, even where, as here, the United States is willing to
commence an independent investigation, it will take time to process
the request of the Singapore authorities, hence, the second tension
between the needs of Singapore's law enforcement and the
sovereignty concerns of the United States remains. The Singapore
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
40. Great Britain could also choose to prosecute our trader based upon the
nationality principle of international law because our trader is a British subject.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 30(1)(a).
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, §§ 17-18.
42. The United States has financial privacy laws that generally limit access by
the government to an individual's account in a financial institution absent a court
order. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1995). These laws rarely apply to a prosecutor
who obtains the appropriate subpoena. A prosecutor must obtain a subpoena,
either from a grand jury or from a court, and the financial institution must provide
the demanded evidence under pain of contempt and its accompanying sanctions.
The prosecutor who obtains the evidence by grand jury subpoena is not permitted,
and is indeed forbidden, to make public disclosure of such evidence unless
authorized by law. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 190.25(4) (providing that
grand jury proceedings are secret); N.Y. PENAL L. § 215.70 (providing that
unlawful grand jury disclosure is a felony). If the prosecutor obtains a court
subpoena calling for the production of the evidence, a protective order might be
issued or a statute might limit what use can be made of the materials. See, e.g.,
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 240.50. That usually means the prosecutor may use it and
disclose it only in court proceedings which are necessarily public. There is a frank
recognition that at a public trial, in a free and open society, a person's private
financial affairs will become public if there is sufficient evidence justifying the
bringing of charges and the ensuing public court proceedings. The first tension is
resolved in favor of the law enforcement interest.
43. See generally id.
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authorities may never learn of the BSJ bank account in Bank
Number Two or the investment in shares of stock unless and until
they obtain the financial records of the U.S. brokerage firm and the
bank in the United States which wire-transferred the funds to BSJ.
There are some jurisdictions which have blanket rules of bank
secrecy that apply to everyone, whether it is a foreign prosecutor
seeking financial information, a domestic prosecutor, a domestic
taxing authority seeking to collect taxes due, or an aggrieved civil
party seeking to collect a debt.' BSJ is an example of such a
jurisdiction but there are many others which have similar blanket
rules of bank secrecy. Here is an example where both of the two
direct tensions are present. They are the individual desire for
financial privacy versus the legitimate desire of Singapore to
investigate crime on the one hand, and the desire of Singapore to
investigate versus the BSJ government's sovereignty concern on the
other.
Let us assume that Singapore's authorities nevertheless choose
to approach the BSJ government for assistance in acquiring the
bank records of the trader's account in Bank Number One in BSJ,
which received the transfer of stolen funds by dollar draft directly
from the Singapore bank. In BSJ, the Penal Code forbids disclo-
sure of bank account information and contains the rule of bank
secrecy. A banker called to testify cannot be forced by the court
to disclose confidential information. BSJ's taxing authorities are
not permitted to require financial institutions to disclose account
information. The BSJ Central Bank, which is responsible for
regulating banks in BSJ, can obtain access to secret bank account
information, but it must observe bank secrecy. BSJ will not
cooperate with an international request for assistance unless the
case involves acts that are crimes under BSJ law.
The Singapore authorities should expect a long wait for the
evidence they seek in BSJ, even assuming that the laws in BSJ
permit cooperation. The Singapore government must transmit the
request for assistance to the Foreign Ministry of BSJ, which will, in
turn, forward the request to the BSJ Justice Minister. The Justice
Minister will examine the request for assistance very carefully, in
view of the strict bank secrecy tradition in that country. The
Minister will look for legal authority to cooperate with the request
for assistance. If that authority is lacking, the request will be
44. See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY, supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRIME
rejected as unlawful. Any suspicion that the matter is unimportant,
or somehow involves a criminal tax investigation, could result in a
refusal to cooperate. If the Minister of Justice finds the requisite
BSJ legal authority, he will review the request to ensure it complies
with each and every rule, and to see that it is not overly broad in
scope. This process takes time. If the request is granted, a BSJ
government official will be directed to review the bank records to
ensure that no more is given than has been authorized by the BSJ
government. At some point, Singapore may get the bank records
but they might not obtain them in time to be useful in their
investigation.
Perhaps the Singapore government will learn of the other
account at Bank Number Two, assuming that the legal hurdles in
the United States have been overcome, and they have been able to
consolidate their request with the one for the account records at
Bank Number One. Regardless, the legal landscape has not
changed. If BSJ refuses the request for cooperation and assistance,
not only will Singapore never learn about the villa in Germany,
they might not ever learn that the trader is living in Germany.45
IV. Analyzing Bank Secrecy Laws
I BSJ's established legal tradition of bank secrecy is founded
upon the notion that bankers in BSJ have no business disclosing
private bank account information. BSJ is a sovereign nation with
its own political and economic concerns, not the least of which is
that banking is the number one industry and source of employment
in that country. Bank secrecy countries like BSJ profit from
international trade at the expense of those countries that enact and
seek to enforce their money laundering and other criminal laws.
In many bank secrecy countries, developed and less developed,
banking is at least an important industry in the local economy. In
either case, the privacy interest and resulting confidentiality rules
are frequently asserted on behalf of an individual who does not,
and perhaps never has, resided in the country, as well as a citizen
or resident of the country. Here, the trader is neither a citizen nor
a resident of BSJ, but he receives the protection of BSJ's bank
secrecy rules.
It will not be helpful to the economies of BSJ or other bank
secrecy countries should the criminals become aware that these
45. Whether and how Singapore may cause the extradition of our hypothetical
trader from Germany to Singapore is beyond the scope of this article.
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governments are providing foreign prosecutors with evidence that
can be used to convict them. Stated another way, the illicit
deposits will go elsewhere, as will the jobs that depend upon them.
Thus, rules ostensibly in place to protect the financial privacy of
individuals might well be motivated by more parochial bread and
butter concerns. Moreover, the political implications of a govern-
ment cooperating with a foreign government's criminal investiga-
tion might be more than the local political officials are willing to
bear, especially where the focus of the investigation is upon a
citizen of that country who is alleged to have committed an
economic crime in the foreign country making the inquiry.
It is also common for corporate bank accounts to be kept
confidential under the bank secrecy rules of BSJ and other bank
secrecy jurisdictions. If the dishonest trader chooses to form a
corporation to further conceal the identity and origin of the stolen
assets, he may gain that protection. What civil right does a legal
fiction like a corporation possess, as against an inquiry or request
for assistance from a foreign government conducting a legitimate
criminal investigation? Is BSJ protecting a legitimate expectation
of privacy when it bars access to the accounts of a corporation, or
is it providing a safe harbor, enabling that corporation and its
shareholders to evade legitimate scrutiny by an interested govern-
ment?
No matter how the request by Singapore to BSJ is resolved,
the reality here is that the balance struck by BSJ law might be on
the side of financial privacy within the first tension, and on the side
of sovereignty within the second tension. Such a tipping of the
balance demonstrates that financial privacy borders on an absolute
civil right in BSJ.
There are countries where there is no bank secrecy law
forbidding access by a prosecutor to the financial records of an
individual or corporation, but these nations, nevertheless, will have
the same sovereignty concerns of every other country. In Germa-
ny, for example there are no bank secrecy laws as such' and the
first tension between the desire for individual privacy versus the
legitimate interest of a foreign government conducting a criminal
investigation is of less importance. But the German authorities will
not simply hand over, or cause to be handed over, evidence from
a financial institution in Germany upon request, nor will they hand
over the property records for the villa the hypothetical trader has
46. See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY, supra note 25, at 213-30.
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purchased in Germany. They will not allow Singapore's police
officers to enter Germany to search the local property registries or
interview witnesses. Germany will require that the appropriate
paperwork and other formalities be completed first. In the mean-
time, the clock is ticking, and is not for the benefit of the Singapore
criminal investigation.
The initial refusal by Germany is based upon important basic
principles of sovereignty. The authorities might feel obliged to say
no, at least initially, for no other reason than because the foreign
prosecutor is from another country. Germany may also feel it owes
a duty to protect its own citizens, residents and institutions from
the inquiring eyes of another government. Certainly Germany, like
every other sovereign nation, does not want agents of a foreign
government crossing its borders and engaging in unauthorized
foreign law enforcement activity. Absent a bilateral or multilateral
agreement requiring cooperation, Germany might feel compelled
to deny access simply because it is a sovereign nation. Thus, a
country with no bank secrecy law could, in effect, become a
financial privacy jurisdiction for no reason other than principles of
sovereignty. Germany's behavior here is not unreasonable, nor is
it significantly different from that of the United States in our
hypothetical illustration, because both countries seek to preserve
their sovereignty by requiring that their laws be observed.
When a criminal investigator or prosecutor seeks evidence in
the form of financial documents, and when that evidence is located
in another country, the investigator will confront one or both of the
two tensions. He must hope that his country has a treaty that
permits the host country's government to cooperate and which will
result in cooperation. He must hope that the authorities are
inclined to cooperate. Absent such a treaty, rarely will there be a
legitimate mechanism to obtain access to the account informa-
tion.47  Instead of conducting an investigation and gathering
evidence, the prosecutor in the international criminal investigation
spends his time filling out treaty or mutual assistance requests and
waiting for the host country authorities' response. However, they
may not respond, even if the treaty allows them to do so. Or they
47. This article assumes that the investigator will not obtain financial
information by illegitimate means, i.e. by bribing corrupt officials inside a foreign
bank. If the information is available only through corrupt means but is
unavailable as evidence obtained by legal means, the bank secrecy laws might have
the adverse effect of contributing to the corruption of bank officials in host
countries.
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might return the request for assistance with demands for more
information. Suffice it to say that the use of bilateral agreement
requests, even when they are in place, is far from efficient when it
comes to gathering the needed evidence within a reasonable
time.48
The hypothetical example of the dishonest trader illustrates the
present lack of a uniform, workable, expedient, and multilateral
approach to combatting international economic crime. This is the
price the international community now pays for permitting govern-
ments to ascribe differing values to privacy interests and related
sovereignty rights. At present, the global community, by its lack of
concerted action, has chosen to value the free flow of capital above
an interest in effectively combatting the spread of international
economic crime.
The principle of bank secrecy may have proceeded from noble
origins in some countries but the realities of modern banking, the
magnitude of international economic crime, the societal conse-
quences of money laundering,49 and the number of bank secrecy
48. For a review of the present mechanisms and limits of international
cooperation, see Jones, supra note 3, at 471-83.
49. Matthew B. Comstock writes:
The mechanism of money laundering permits profitable criminal activity.
"Without laundering, the risk/reward ratio for the underlying crime is
unattractive ... Efficient laundering renders the underlying crime
lucrative, and therefore perpetuates it." Thus money laundering
represents the keystone to successful organized crime.
Legitimizing illegal profits also poses a threat to the licit economy.
First, as noted previously, organized criminals view real estate as the
injection method of choice. In the real estate example given, the buyer
paid three million dollars for property with a fair market value of two
million dollars. Such a scheme effectively "legitimizes" criminal profits
by making them appear to be real estate profits; however, the scheme
also inflates local real estate values. Banks approve loans which utilize
inflated property as collateral. Often borrowers purchase additional real
estate, given that the market appears to be lucrative. In economic terms,
an inflated market such as this is known as a "speculative bubble."
Speculative bubbles inevitably burst. Money laundering, therefore, may
lead to a real estate market crash.
Second, use of the legitimate financial institutions to "wash" illicit
profits threatens the integrity of the entire system. "The fear of financial
regulators is that when credit and financial institutions are used to
launder proceeds from criminal activities ... the soundness and stability
of the [particular] institution concerned and confidence in the financial
system as a whole could be seriously jeopardized." When a legitimate
financial institution launders illegal profits, knowingly or not, that
institution supports illegal drug trafficking, prostitution, and illegal arms
sales throughout the world.
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jurisdictions today,5" have increased the two tensions addressed in
this article. In a global economy, where most of the economies of
various countries are linked, we can no longer afford to pursue the
outmoded methods of nineteenth century cooperation (or non-
cooperation) when international criminals are practicing twenty-first
century methods. The only distinction between money laundering
and the ordinary legitimate financial transaction is the illicit source
of the money. Thus, it is all the more important for countries to
seek a multilateral solution, fighting international economic crime
effectively while respecting legitimate expectations of privacy.
A person's financial affairs should not be available to any and
all who would desire access. What must be determined is the
appropriate balance to be struck between the legitimate interest of
a government conducting an investigation or prosecution of
international crime on the one hand, and protecting the individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy on the other. One cannot avoid
finding the proper balance between a foreign law enforcement
request versus the sovereignty concerns of host countries if there
is to be an effective mechanism for combatting international
economic crime.
V. Forward: Resolving the Tensions
Any approach to determining what is, or should be, private
requires an examination of what is genuinely private financial
information and what is, at least de facto, public or quasi public
information and the concerns that come into play. From whom is
it desired that the financial information is kept confidential? Do
bank secrecy countries, de jure or de facto, seek to keep financial
information private for the sake of privacy, or because they do not
wish to endure the loss of deposits when foreign governments are
granted access to the evidence located in those bank secrecy
countries? What recognition should the international community
give to the value judgments made by bank secrecy countries when
they grant a civil right of privacy to financial records? The best
analysis begins with an examination of which asset is, or should be,
protected from government scrutiny due to a legitimate expectation
of privacy, and which should not. One should also examine the
Matthew B. Comstock, Gatt and Gats: A Public Morals Attack on Money
Laundering, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 144-45 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
50. One need only examine the advertisements in a respected international
magazine like the Economist to understand that bank secrecy and shielding assets
from the inquiring eyes of a government are big business today.
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specific financial assets and determine whether there is a legitimate
sovereignty concern. When this is done, it is obvious that, for most
asset categories, the answer is no.
In many countries, the identity of a nominal owner of real
estate is public or quasi public information. One need only
proceed to the local property registry to learn the identity of the
owner, whether he has borrowed money to purchase the property,
how much debt is on the property and so on. There can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy by the owner of the real estate.
Any nation that denies access to such information, or cooperation,
to a foreign prosecutor making an inquiry about such assets is not
basing its decision on any privacy concern. More likely, the
decision is based purely upon a political or sovereignty consider-
ation. The hypothetical trader cannot have any legitimate
expectation of privacy in public records.
In the case of drafts or checks, multitudes of persons inside
and outside of the bank have access to these documents because
they must be cleared and settled among the banks that come into
possession of them in the ordinary course of business. Thus, a
person who deposits a dollar draft in a European bank should
know that the draft will find its way through the international bank
payments system, through the clearinghouse in New York and,
eventually, back to the bank issuing the draft. Here too, there is
no de facto privacy attached to the transaction nor any reasonable
expectation of privacy." Any government through whose
territory any part of the transaction passes, which denies access to
a foreign prosecutor, is de facto basing that decision upon some-
thing other than a concern for the civil right of privacy.
Wire transfers and their use in the international bank pay-
ments system are very similar to the check/draft example given
above. A host of persons having no relationship whatsoever to the
sending or receiving party or his banker will know of and be privy
to the details of the transfer. Is making confidential the details of
the wire transfer based upon the civil right of privacy or are there
other forces at work here? Does one deny access to a government
51. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips held
as records at a bank. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). The Court
recognized the realities of the banking business when it stated that "The checks
are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." Id.
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conducting a legitimate criminal investigation because the informa-
tion has been kept private, or is it because one does not want that
foreign government to see it and use it for reasons having nothing
to do with the civil right of privacy?
Real estate purchases, the use of drafts and last but not least,
the wire transfer, are a few of the tools used by criminals to
launder illicit funds. Yet, as has been demonstrated above, if a
foreign prosecutor is denied access to this information, it cannot be
because the information is really private information that has been
kept private. More likely, it is based upon sovereignty, political, or
economic considerations.
Any discussion of financial privacy rights versus the interest of
governments in investigating and prosecuting international crime
would not be complete without addressing the traditional personal
bank account located in a foreign bank. Clearly that information
is, and should remain, private from ordinary disclosure. There is
a reasonable expectation of privacy by that account holder. But
should the account be kept confidential if there is reason to believe
that it has been used as a vehicle for committing crime or launder-
ing the proceeds of crime? Should a country be permitted to
benefit from international trade while implementing a bank secrecy
policy that frustrates cross-border battles against international
crime? The answer to this question lies in an examination of
national and international priorities.
If nations believe that the privacy rights of the individual
holder of a bank account or any other account in a financial
institution should prevail over governments, then governments will
continue protecting financial privacy rights and related sovereignty
concerns which vary from country to country. On the other hand,
if one could devise a uniform, workable, and expedient multilateral
mechanism for international cooperation, which contains adequate
safeguards against unreasonable fishing expeditions, and grants due
deference to legitimate privacy and sovereignty concerns, then
perhaps the right balance may be found.
Governments from hard currency countries52 could begin the
process by agreeing to discuss the interest in privacy and the
common interest in detecting and prosecuting international crime.
After all, it is the hard currency countries and their bank payment
systems that are used as the means for money laundering and other
international crime. Too often it is also these countries which are
52. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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deprived of legitimate tax revenues when bank secrecy countries
permit individuals and corporations to hide their income from those
governments. The commonly held view that the fiscal laws of one
country need not, and should not, be supported or enforced by
other countries is too often the loophole through which the entire
money laundering industry is driven.
There are various forums for such discussions. The Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the Group of Seven (G-7) are all possible forums.
Each forum possesses expertise in dealing with international
transfers of assets, economics, banking issues, and international law.
Unfortunately, the use of such well established groups is problemat-
ic because they are slow in arriving at decisions or taking positions
on international issues. Moreover, these kinds of forums tend to
make recommendations which may or may not be adopted by
members and, therefore, lack any enforcement mechanisms which
mandate implementation of recommendations.
Regardless of which forum is chosen, there must be a frank
recognition that financial privacy is only one of the concerns that
arise when a foreign government seeks information and evidence
in the host country, and that there are other forces at work when
governments profess an inability to cooperate with each other in
international criminal investigations and prosecutions. After all,
bank secrecy laws were a reaction to restrictions upon the free flow
of capital and governments profit from the movement of that
capital from one country to another. Stated another way, govern-
ments must recognize that benefits realized by individual countries
provide a strong motivation to continue their bank secrecy
traditions.
Governments must agree at the outset that the existence of
confidentiality laws blindly applied can and does frustrate legiti-
mate criminal investigations and prosecutions. There should be
more of a focus upon what reasonable expectations of privacy exist
with respect to the ownership of assets, and less of a focus upon
rules for the sake of rules. That includes a reexamination of the
sovereignty rule53 as it applies to the enforcement of bank secrecy
53. Professor Janis writes:
A sovereign state is one that is free to independently govern its own
population in its own territory and set its own foreign policy.
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (2d ed. 1974).
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laws and other financial privacy rules affecting home country
investigations and prosecutions of international economic crime.54
The solution to the problem must be multilateral,55 along the
lines of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).56
A multilateral agreement should contain at least six key provisions
that relate to international criminal investigations and prosecutions.
First, the agreement must provide that information which is
public or quasi public under the laws of one country must not be
withheld from another signatory country, and should be disclosed
promptly. For example, in the case of real estate where the laws
of the host country provide that the information in the property
registry is public within the host country, the host country must
provide that information upon the request of a signatory country.
Other examples might include ownership information for motor
vehicles, ships, shares of stock, and other asset vehicles for
laundering funds. In the case of the hypothetical trader, there
seems to be no legitimate reason to refuse prompt and expeditious
disclosure to Singapore of the location and ownership of the villa.
Standing upon the naked right of sovereignty when public or quasi
54. Janis sets forth the inherent tension between sovereignty and international
law. He writes:
In the real world, neither sovereignty nor international law could reign
absolutely without vanquishing the other. The lesson of history seems to
be that in practice neither sovereignty nor international law ever
completely beats its opponent. Rather, a balance is struck between
sovereignty and international law, an accommodation that makes up an
essential aspect of international politics at any point in time.
Id. at 151-52.
It is precisely this balance which must be struck in the area of bank secrecy
and financial privacy laws as they affect the investigation and prosecution of
international economic crime.
55. The unilateral solution to the problem is obvious - simply deny access to
the international payments clearing mechanism to bank secrecy jurisdictions. A
refusal to cooperate with an investigation or prosecution by a hard currency
country would result in the inability of that bank secrecy country to clear its
financial transactions in the currency of the home country. The difficulty with this
approach is that it is unilateral. Unilateral approaches to international problems
rarely result in effective solutions. Here the implementation of such a unilateral
solution might result in another free market response - avoidance of the use of
the home country's currency for international commercial transactions.
One writer has suggested an international trade solution and advocated that
the Group of Seven Countries ought to impose tariffs on certain goods and
services of nations that refuse to criminalize money laundering. See generally
Comstock, supra note 49. Comstock suggests that international law would support
the imposition of such trade sanctions. Id at 172.
56. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
1996]
544 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3
public records are involved is arbitrary and irresponsible to the
international community in a global economy filled with economic
crime.
Second, any financial transaction, including drafts and wire
transfers, that crosses international boundaries must not be consid-
ered confidential as between any originating or receiving jurisdic-
tion, or as to any intermediary jurisdiction, where any one of them
is conducting a criminal investigation or prosecution. As was
demonstrated above, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
when an account holder chooses to move funds across borders by
use of the international bank payments system and when many
persons apart from an individual's banker have access to that
information. If private individuals can be made privy to such
information, there is no reason to withhold such information from
governments conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions
for violations of their laws when a financial transaction has crossed
its territorial boundaries. Such a provision would go a long way
toward defeating the incentive for money launderers to route their
transactions through multitudes of jurisdictions and banks.
Third, corporate financial accounts, in whatever form, should
not be held private against a request for assistance by a signatory
country conducting a criminal investigation or prosecution, if there
is a nexus established by the home country between the matter
under investigation or prosecution and the corporate financial
accounts. Corporations and other limited liability companies are
legal fictions and, as such, have no reasonable expectation of
privacy against governments attempting to enforce their criminal
laws in countries where corporations choose to do business.
Nevertheless, corporations and limited liability companies are
legitimate forms of doing business and are used appropriately by
private, law-abiding individuals to avoid civil liability and for other
legitimate purposes. The nexus requirement respects the legitimacy
of the use of such entities while enabling a home country prosecu-
tor to obtain legitimate access when required.
Fourth, governments should protect private, individual
accounts in financial institutions held by natural persons from
disclosure to foreign governments conducting criminal investiga-
tions or prosecutions, if the host country finds no nexus to the
matter under investigation by the home country prosecutor. After
all, there is a clear expectation of privacy in a personal financial
account. Under this provision, the good faith of the host country
where the account is located will be critical because private bank
accounts are commonly used to harbor the fruits of crimes and to
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launder illegally obtained funds. This provision will protect the
reasonable expectation of privacy of an individual account holder,
while at the same time mandating sincere cooperation between the
host country and the home country where the nexus to the crime
in the home country is established. It will also accommodate the
traditional sovereignty concerns of governments. It is envisioned
that the host country authorities would examine the account
records of the individual account holder. Should the host country
authorities determine a nexus between the crimes under investiga-
tion or prosecution and the private financial account records, they
should make disclosure to the requesting government upon the
ground that the improper use of the account is an offense against
domestic and international public order. If no nexus is found, the
request can be denied and the legitimate expectation of privacy is
respected.
Fifth, any multilateral agreement must provide for expeditious
cooperation, mandatory, not permissive compliance by signatories,
and the bar of nations refusing to sign on from the international
bank payments system. Signatory nations failing to honor their
obligations should, after an appropriate adjudication by an
international tribunal,57 be barred from the bank payments clearing
systems in every signatory country. The realities of international
commerce being what they are, once the hard currency countries
agree to such a multilateral mechanism, virtually every other nation
will be forced to sign on and observe their international obligations
if they wish to engage in international commerce.
Sixth, there should be agreement upon which generic crimes
will require cooperation. At the very least, crimes involving theft,
fraud, murder, narcotics trafficking, illegal arms smuggling,
terrorism, and related money laundering should be included. More
problematic are offenses such as insider trading and tax evasion by
individuals. Insider trading is not an offense in some countries.
57. Any multilateral agreement must provide for a formal dispute resolution
mechanism. One such mechanism could provide for a series of steps designed to
resolve any dispute arising from the failure or refusal of a signatory nation to
comply with a proper request from another signatory nation. The first step could
be bilateral consultations. If such consultations are unsuccessful, the next step
could be formal proceedings conducted by an international tribunal, which would
render a report and decision. Finally, and if there were no compliance with the
decision of the tribunal, bilateral or multilateral retaliation could be authorized.
A similar mechanism is provided for the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules
and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Uruguay Round Trade
Agreement, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 at 339 (1994).
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Inclusion of tax evasion would conflict with the international
principle of law that one country need not enforce the fiscal laws
of another but perhaps the time has come for a reevaluation of this
principle. Ironically, the tax rates in the hard currency countries
are not insignificant and those countries have the most to gain if
tax evasion was a listed crime requiring cooperation. The refusal
to cooperate in criminal tax investigations may have outlived its
usefulness in a global economy. Lack of agreement on this
question should not be an obstacle to adopting an agreement which
covers the suggested list of crimes above.
The proposed model multilateral agreement presupposes that
requests for assistance are made in good faith, and that requests
from countries are not politically motivated or constitute a
disguised violation of human rights or international law. Requests
for international assistance that constitute nothing more than a
fishing expedition, a political vendetta, or something other than a
bona fide request for assistance should be rejected. The provision
setting forth a list of generic crimes along the lines suggested will
go a long way toward avoiding bad faith requests.
The model's purpose is to facilitate acquisition of documentary
evidence in criminal cases, not to compel a citizen of a host country
to travel to the home country making the request. Any mechanism
that compels a host country citizen to travel and give evidence in
the home country is problematic. Most countries would find such
a mechanism unacceptable as upon basic and important notions of
sovereignty and protection of their nationals from undue burdens.
Finally, the model requires that in all cases of requests for
international assistance, a sufficient nexus be established by the
home country between the crimes in the home country and the
documentary evidence located in the host country. It is not
intended that any country should provide the financial account
information upon a mere oral request. The home country should
be required to certify, whether in the form of a court proceeding
pending in the home country or some other formal forum, that an
investigation or prosecution is underway and state, with reasonable
particularity, the connection between the home country investiga-
tion or prosecution, and the requested documents believed to exist
in the host country. These kinds of safeguards should preclude
baseless "fishing" expeditions.
Any multilateral agreement will require individual nations to
compromise their sovereign interests and change some of their laws
before any effective multilateral mechanism for international
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cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions can be
adopted. Such compromises are not without precedent.
The history of the GATT is a concrete example of how nations
have recognized that they have a common interest in resolving
important international issues and conflicts. Many nations had to
change long established trade laws and related rules in order to live
up to their obligations in GATT. If nations can agree on a frame-
work for multilateral uniform approaches to international trade,
surely a multilateral approach to cross-border crime is possible.
GATT was adopted because individual nations recognized their
mutuality of interest. It remains to be seen whether such a recogni-
tion will ever be forthcoming in combatting cross-border crime.
The European Community (EC) took a useful first step with
the European Directive on Money Laundering of 1991.19 The
Directive is another example of nations recognizing their mutuality
of interest in combatting international economic crime. The Money
Laundering Directive represents a compromise of sovereign,
political, and economic interests by EC Member States and
represents an attempt to deal with and prevent money laundering.
It defines money laundering' broadly and the definition is not
limited to narcotics money laundering.6 The Directive requires
Member States to take various steps to penalize and combat money
laundering,62 and provides that anyone reporting suspected money
laundering to the authorities within a Member State shall be free
from liability of any kind.63 Finally, the Directive encourages
58. Indeed the United Nations has taken a step in this direction. The United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, was completed in Vienna in 1988
[hereinafter the Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention requires, inter alia,
that signatory nations make certain changes in their domestic laws, criminalize
certain conduct relating to drug trafficking and mandates certain international
cooperation in narcotics cases. For a general discussion of the Vienna Convention
and its provisions, see generally Bhala et al., Legal Aspects of Money Laundering,
3 MALAYAN L.J. 33, 35-37 (1991). The Vienna Convention pierces bank secrecy
laws by prohibiting signatory nations from refusing mutual legal assistance in
narcotics cases based upon bank secrecy.
59. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 (O.J. L166/77 28.6.91) [hereinafter
Money Laundering Directive].
60. The definition of money laundering in the Directive is taken from that
adopted in the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 58, pmbl.
61. Id. art. 1. Criminal activity is defined in such a way that crime is that
specified in the Vienna Convention and "[A]ny other criminal activity designated
as such for the purpose of this Directive by each Member State." Id.
62. Id. art. 2-18.
63. Id. art. 9. This provision appears directed against bank secrecy laws.
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Member States to cooperate with each other in preventing and
investigating money laundering.6  The Money Laundering
Directive is of value to Member States within the EC in their
attempt to combat money laundering, but it does not address the
global problem of investigating and prosecuting international
economic crime.'
The hard currency countries stand to benefit under the
proposed model. They are all democratic societies where tax rates
are significant and important financial centers are located, and
where the opportunities for misdeeds are greatest. Their currencies
are used most often to launder the proceeds of crime. This is not
to suggest that only the hard currency countries will benefit from
the proposed model. Soft currency nations and lesser developed
countries have an interest in improving the integrity, transparency,
and regulation of their markets. Such improvements will result in
the attraction of additional capital and international business to
those countries. All countries stand to benefit from any mechanism
that requires expeditious international cooperation in criminal
cases, especially those countries that are rapidly being forced to
confront the drug problem spreading throughout the world. It
appears irrational for democratic societies in a position to influence
international law and conduct to stand by and allow bank secrecy
jurisdictions to profit at their expense, while those very countries
are permitted to benefit from international trade.
Returning to the example of the hypothetical trader, he will
possess far fewer options should he commit the crime. Under the
proposed multilateral model, he cannot hope to escape detection
for any extended time. Singapore' will obtain expedient coopera-
tion in tracing the trail of funds, and perhaps when faced with all
of the obstacles to laundering the stolen funds, he might choose to
engage in more honest, safe and lawful financial activity.
64. Id. pmbl.
65. The United Kingdom has gone one step further in cases of serious or
complex fraud. It has enacted legislation permitting the Secretary of State to refer
requests for assistance from foreign governments to the Director of the Serious
Fraud Office (SFO). Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act of 1990, § 4
as amended by Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, § 164. The
Director of the SFO may assist foreign governments conducting investigations or
prosecutions of serious or complex frauds and the authorization is not limited to
Member States of the European Union. Id.
66. Before anyone sheds a tear for the frustrating quest of the Singapore
authorities in the hypothetical example, it should be noted that Singapore is also
a bank secrecy jurisdiction. See generally ANGELINE YAP, INTERNATIONAL BANK
SECRECY, supra note 25, at 577-618.
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VI. Conclusion
The international investigation and prosecution of economic
crime gives rise to two tensions. The first tension is between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement versus the desire for confiden-
tiality of an individual's financial affairs. The second tension is
between law enforcement in a home country versus the political,
economic, and sovereignty concerns of governments in host
countries. The present ad hoc approach to international coopera-
tion will not facilitate effective cross-border investigations and
prosecutions in criminal cases. The international community of
governments should look behind the ostensible privacy rationale for
financial privacy laws and examine the de facto economic rationale
for such laws, along with sovereignty and political concerns lying
behind such laws. The proposed multilateral approach provides an
effective and expeditious mechanism by which governments may
agree to assist each other in criminal cases which cross international
borders. The asset-based model preserves privacy where privacy
should be preserved. It comports with the realities of cross-border
financial transactions and cross-border economic crime by recogniz-
ing that, in both circumstances, there are no effective geographic
boundaries. The model requires governments to recognize their
mutuality of interest in combatting international crime and to
compromise their sovereign interests. There is precedent for such
compromises, but there must be the political will to make them.
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